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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1988) as
this is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction of a
criminal charge in the Fifth Circuit Court, County of
Washington, State of Utah.

On October 3, 1989, appellant

Brent Alan Turner was convicted of violating the St. George
City Obscenity Ordinance No. 2-77-2 (See Addendum).

Prior to

the trial on March 28, 1989, the Honorable Judge David Mower
denied appellant Brent Alan Turner's motion to dismiss the
charges against him and during the course of the trial Judge
Mower also denied appellant's motion for a directed verdict.
This appeal challenges the propriety of Judge Mower's decision
on both appellant's motion to dismiss and appellant's motion
for a directed verdict.

Additionally, this appeal seeks an

appellate court determination of whether the appellant
displayed material depicting hard core sexual conduct in a
patently offensive manner.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does the St. George Obscenity Statute under

which appellant was convicted violate the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 15 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah because that ordinance is
overly broad and/or unconstitutionally vague?

2.

Has the St. George Obscenity Statute been

unconstitutionally applied in this case?

Put another way,

under Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 143, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974)
can the material displayed in Mr. Turner's business be
considered obscene consistent with the protection afforded
speech by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 15 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah?
3.

Did the State meet its burden of proof to

establish the necessary elements of Mr. Turner's alleged
crime.

More specifically, did the State establish that the

material in question:
a.

Appealed to a prurient interest in sex;

b.

Portrayed sexual conduct in a patently offensive

manner;
c.

Had no serious literary, artistic, political, or

scientific value when taken as a whole.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND ORDINANCES
The following constitutional provisions and
ordinances are considered by appellant to require
interpretation by this court in order for the court to render a
decision on the issues presented for appeal:
A.

The St. George City Obscenity Statute, Ordinance

No. 2-77-2 is too lengthy to reproduce in its entirety here.
Consequently, the Ordinance is reproduced in its entirety and
attached hereto in the Addendum.
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B.

The First Amendment to the United States

Constitution:
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for redress
of grievances.
C.

Article I, Section 15 of the Constitution of the

State of Utah:
No law shall be passed to abridge or
restrain the freedom of speech or of the
press. • • •

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By Information dated November 15, 1988, (Record
page 1) appellant Brent Alan Turner was charged with
violation of the St. George City Obscenity Ordinance No. 2-77-2
§§ 2a(l) and (2). On March 28, 1989, the Honorable Judge David
Mower denied Mr. Turner's motion to dismiss.
106.)

(Record page

In that motion, Mr. Turner argued that the St. George

City Obscenity Statute was both unconstitutional on its face
and unconstitutionally applied in Mr. Turner's case.
page 31 - 43, 84 - 90.)

(Record

On October 23, after denying Mr.

Turner's motion for a directed verdict (Trial Transcript pp.
196 - 207, at Addendum) the case was submitted to a jury which
convicted him of the crimes charged in the Information.
(Record page 190.)
At trial the State alleged that two bed sheets which
hung on the wall of Mr. Turner's business in Washington County,
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Utah and which had been hand painted with spray paint depicted
obscene material in violation of the St. George City Obscenity
Ordinance.

(See trial exhibits 1 - 5

which are photographic

depictions of the bed sheets as they appeared in Mr. Turner's
business.

The actual photographs do not have a record page

designation.)

To meet their burden of proof, at trial the

State put on two witnesses, both St. George City police
officers, who just happened to visit Mr. Turner's business and
while there photographed the pertinent bed sheets.

(See Trial

Transcript pages 117 - 196.)
Rather than set forth a description of the two
"offending" bed sheets herein, appellant invites the court to
review the relevant photographs which were admitted at trial as
exhibits 1 - 5 .

A request has been made to the Fifth Circuit

Court to transmit such photographs to the Utah Court of Appeals
as quickly as possible.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First, appellant Turner contends that the St. George
City Obscenity Statute contains within its definition of
obscenity matters which are considered protected speech and may
not be proscribed consistent with the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the
Utah Constitution.

Specifically, only patently offensive

depictions of "hard core" sexual conduct may be considered
obscene and if an anti-obscenity law includes non-hard core
material within its definition of obscenity, as written or
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construed, then that statute is unconstitutional.

The St.

George Obscenity Statute goes far beyond permissible
constitutional boundaries.

For example, the ordinance makes

any "spread eagle exposure of female genital organs" obscene.
Such blanket prohibition of the display of female genitalia
is too broad to be constitutionally permissible.
Second, even if the St. George City Obscenity Statute
is constitutional on its face, it has been unconstitutionally
applied in this case.

Only graphic depictions of hard core

sexual conduct may be constitutionally prohibited and then only
when the "dominant theme" of the work is to display such
hard-core sexual conduct.

The rough hand spray painted

drawings that appear on Mr. Turner's bed sheets are startlingly
tame when compared to other material which the United States
Supreme Court has found to be insufficiently "hard-core" to be
the subject of legitimate, constitutionally appropriate,
prosecution.

Furthermore, the "dominant theme" of Mr. Turner's

bed sheets is political, espousing such messages as "Fuck
authority", "Why not let someone else think for you?" and
"You're afraid, face it."

Under the mandate of Jenkins v.

Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974) this court, as
well as the court below, is obligated to make a threshold
determination as to whether the material in question is
sufficiently "hard-core" to be presented to a jury for
determination of obscenity.

In light of the past decisions of

the United States Supreme Court, which helped define what is
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hard-core and what is not, Mr. Turner's bed sheets are not
"hard core."

Thus his conviction should be overturned.

Third, in this case, as in all criminal cases, the
State has the burden to prove each element of the crime.
State utterly failed to do so in this case.

The

In fact, one of

the State's witnesses conceded that Mr. Turner's bed sheets
contained political and social messages and testified that it
did not appeal to his prurient interest in sex.

The State's

failure to meet its burden is fatal to its case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS
BURDEN OF PROOF.
As an obvious starting point, the State bears the
burden in this case, as in all criminal cases, to prove each
and every element of the crime alleged.
627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981).

State v. Starks,

Next, and equally obvious, if the

State fails to meet its burden the defendant is entitled to an
acquittal.
1978).

State v. Housekeeper, 588 P.2d 139, 140 (Utah

The fact that this is an obscenity case does not alter

the State's burden.

United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458

(9th Cir. 1984) cert, den. 105 S.Ct. 926, 83 L.Ed.2d
938.
Regardless of whether the defendant resides in St.
George, Utah, New York City, New York, or anywhere else within
the United States, and regardless of what is recited in the St.
George City Obscenity Statute, the prosecutor's burden in every
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obscenity case, nationwide, is the same and is set forth in
Miller v, California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 37 L.Ed.2d 419
(1973).

The prosecution must prove three elements:
1.

That the work, taken as a whole, appeals to

prurient interest;
2.

That the work is "hard-core" pornography which

depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct;
3.

That the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious

literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24. Unless the prosecution in this case has proved
each element, defendant's conviction should be reversed.
Appellant must concede that under the many cases in
which the State's burden of proof in an obscenity trial has
been considered the State's burden with regard to the first two
prongs of the Miller three prong test is very light.

Indeed,

while it is clear that the State bears the burden of proving
each of the three Miller prongs, with regard to the first two
prongs apparently the State is required to neither produce
expert testimony, nor any other form of evidence to meet its
burden.

Apparently, with regard to the third prong of the

Miller test, the State bears some burden of proof over and
above its burden with regard to the first two prongs.

See

United States v. Merrill, supra, 746 F.2d at 464.
Perhaps all that can be safely said regarding exactly what the
State must do to establish that a particular work lacks serious
literary, artistic, or political value is that the State must
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introduce some evidence in that regard.

In this case the State

did nothing.
The State called two witnesses.

The first, was

Kevin Sullivan, a St. George City policeman.

Officer

Sullivan's testimony is set forth in pages 117 - 162 of the
Trial Transcript.

At no point does Officer Sullivan express an

opinion, comment, or in any way address the concept that the
bed sheets hanging in Mr. Turner's business lack serious
literary, artistic or political value.

In fact, the only time

Officer Sullivan expresses any opinion regarding the political
nature of the ideas expressed on the bed sheets he concedes
that the term "fuck authority" can be a political statement.
(Trial Transcript p. 143, at Addendum.)
The State's second witness, Jim Hatzidakis, another
St. George City police officer, on cross-examination commented
in more detail regarding the content of the graffiti on the
bed sheets.

For instance, the following exchange took place:

Q.

And you don't deny that on that wall
in all that 'graffiti' as you said,
are political statements?

A.

I would say some of them were probably.

(Trial Transcript p. 191, at Addendum.)
Officer Hatzidakis conceded that there was an anti-drug
message within the graffiti, (Trial Transcript 190 - 191, at
Addendum); that other matters set forth on the bed sheets had
no meaning at all to him (Trial Transcript p. 188, at
Addendum); and that other items were certainly not sexual in
nature (Trial Transcript pp. 189 - 190, at Addendum).
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Finally, in what is a rather remarkable exchange considering
Officer Hatzidakis was called as one of the State's only two
witnesses, Mr. Hatzidakis concedes that the work taken as
whole did not appeal to his prurient interest:
Q.

Out of the ordinary, unusual, but was
it designed, when looking at this
whole thing as a whole, was it
designed to appeal to your prurient
interests in sexual matters.

A.

I would - no.

Q.

No, right?

A.

No.

(Trial Transcript pp. 193 - 194, at Addendum.)
Although appellant concedes that exactly what the
State must introduce by way of evidence to bear its burden of
proof in obscenity cases is a difficult matter to deduce from a
review of the case law, it is clear that the State must
introduce something pertinent to each element and that the
State is required to do something extra with regard to its
burden of proving the third prong of the Miller test.

See,

United States v. Merrill, supra; United States v.
Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132, 135
(2nd Cir. 1983).

In this case, the State introduced no

evidence regarding any of the three prongs of the Miller
test.

In fact, one of the State's two witnesses testified

unequivocally that the work taken as a whole did not appeal to
his prurient interests and conceded that at least some the
items displayed were political or literary in nature.

Perhaps

the only workable standard to judge whether the State has met
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its burden of proof in the prosecution of obscenity cases is to
concede that each film, each book, each work of art, or each
bed sheet which is allegedly obscene presents a unique mix of
ideas and concepts and therefore the proof required to
establish that such works lack serious political, literary, or
artistic value will be unique as well.
analysis is required.

Thus, a case by case

In any event, however, when the State

fails to produce expert testimony addressing the political
content of the obscene work, fails to produce other works for
comparison, fails to introduce scholarly treatises or other
authority criticizing or analyzing the work as a whole, and
even fails to produce lay testimony addressing the critical
third prong of the Miller test, the State has failed to meet
its burden.
POINT II
THE ST. GEORGE OBSCENITY ORDINANCE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE.
A.

Historical perspective in light of Miller v. California.
The issue of what types of "speech" states, counties

or municipalities may or may not prohibit has generated
considerable litigation.

The most definitive pronouncement

from the United States Supreme Court on the subject came in the
case of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 37 L.Ed.2d 419
(1973).

In Miller the court reiterated that speech found to

be obscene is not protected by the First Amendment and can
subject the "speaker" to criminal prosecution.

The question

was in Miller and is once again in this case, how can
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legislation define what is "obscene" without infringing upon
speech which is protected by the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution?
In Miller the court set forth a three part test to
be included in anti-obscenity legislation.

Id. at 24. In

order for anti-obscenity legislation to be constitutional it
must declare obscene only material which when taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest, depicts specifically defined
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way and lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value.

Id.

The

allegedly obscene material must meet all three criteria or it
is protected speech and cannot subject the "speaker" to
criminal prosecution.

See, Miller, supra, Kois v.

Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 33 L.Ed.2d 312 (1972); Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974).
It is also clear that under the holdings of the
United States Supreme Court only patently offensive depictions
of "hard core" sexual conduct may be considered obscene.

If an

anti-obscenity law includes non-hard core material within the
definition of obscenity, as written or construed, then the
statute is unconstitutional.

Chief Justice Berger, writing

for the court in Miller v. California stated:
Under the holdings announced today, no one
will be subject to prosecution for the sale
or exposure of obscene materials unless
these materials depict or describe patently
offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct
specifically defined by the regulating
state law as written or construed.
(Emphasis added.)
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Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.

See also,

Home Box Office v.

Wilkinson/ 531 F.Supp. at 994 wherein the court stated:
States may not go beyond Miller in
prescribing criminal penalties for
distribution of sexually oriented
materials. For better or worse, Miller
establishes the analytical boundary of
permissible state involvement.
Id. at 994.

See also United States v. Various Articles

of Obscene Merchandise, 562 F.2d 185, cert, den, in
Long v. United States, 436 U.S. 931, 56 L.Ed.2d 776 (1977)
(only hard core sexual conduct may be obscene); United States
v. Obscene Magazines, Books and Advertising Material, 653 F.2d
381 (9th Cir. 1981) (proscriptions against obscenity must
be limited to hard core sexual conduct); Graham v. Hill,
444 F.Supp. 584 (D.Texas 1978) (only hard core sexual conduct
may be prohibited).
What is or is not to be considered "hard core sexual
conduct" has also been the subject of much litigation, but
several matters are clear.

First, nudity alone, however

clearly displayed or in whatever detail depicted, is not
obscene, even when viewed by minors.

See, Jenkins v.

Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974); Schad v.
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 - 66, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 and
ftn. 10, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975); Home Box Office, Inc. v.
Wilkinson, 531 F.Supp. 986, 996 (Dist. Utah 1982).
Next, as the Supreme Court announced in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), "Sex and obscenity are not
synonyms . . . the portrayal of sex, e.g. in art, literature
12

and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny
the material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech
and press."

Id. at 487.

In a case called Huffman v.

United States, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971) remanded in 502
F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (obscenity conviction overturned)
the court offered an exhaustive history of what has and what
has not been considered obscene.

For example, with regard to

films or photographic depictions it is clear that "the mere
exposure of genitalia is not sufficient to justify finding a
photograph obscene."

Id. at 399 citing Sunshine Book

Company v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958).

It is also

clear that magazines in which there are pictures of young women
either naked or clad in only garter belts and other attire
employed to frame the pubic area and to focus attention upon
it are not obscene.

Huffman, 470 F.2d at 399 citing

Central Magazine Sales v. United States, 389 U.S. 50, 10
L.Ed.2d 49 (1968).

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly for

this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit after reviewing the pertinent United States Supreme
Court decisions, announced:
[W]e are obliged to conclude that no
photograph of the female anatomy, no matter
how posed if no sexual activity is being
engaged in, or however lacking in social
value, can be held obscene.
Hunt v. Keriakos, 428 F.2d 606, 608 (1st Cir. 1970),
cert, den. 400 U.S. 929, 27 L.Ed.2d 189.
Thus, in summary, the kind of hard core pornography
that the Court in Miller recognized could be considered
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obscene does not include simple nudity, and does not include
the display of human, female genitalia regardless of how
explicit or how detailed, unless some form of sexual action
is also portrayed.
B.

The St. George obscenity ordinance is unconstitutionally

over-broad.
By its terms the St. George obscenity statute
encompasses within the definition of obscenity matters which
are clearly protected by the First Amendment and which clearly
cannot be considered obscene.

For example, under the

definition of "sexual conduct" the statute includes "any
explicit close-up representation of a human genital organ or a
spread eagle exposure of female genital organs."

§le(2).

Such

pictorial representations, absent the depiction of some kind of
sexual activity, cannot be considered obscene and are protected
by the First Amendment.

See, Central Magazine Sales v.

United States, supra, and Hunt v. Keriakos, supra.
The statute goes on to include within the definition of "sexual
conduct" simple nudity.

§le(4).

Once again, it is clear that

simple nudity cannot be considered obscene under any
circumstances.

See, Jenkins v. Georgia, supra; Home Box

Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, supra.
Appellant concedes that when possible a court
considering the constitutionality of an ordinance dealing
with the First Amendment should construe the law narrowly and
in a constitutional manner.

However, the St. George obscenity

statute is so riddled with infirmities it is not capable of
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being constitutionally construed.

As Judge Jenkins stated in

Home Box Office, Inc. v, Wilkinson, supra:
To construe the otherwise plain terms of
the statute to a meaning consistent with
Miller 'simply
exchanges over-breadth for
vagueness.1 (citations omitted.)
Home Box Office, 531 F.Supp. at 998.

The St. George

obscenity statute is capable of only one construction within
the plain terms of its language.

That construction includes

within the definition of obscenity matters which are entitled
to First Amendment protection.

Therefore, the statute is

unconstitutionally over-broad and must be struck down.
POINT III
THE ST. GEORGE OBSCENITY STATUTE HAS BEEN
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED IN THIS CASE.
A.

The court must determine if the allegedly obscene material

is sufficiently "hard core" to be submitted to the jury.
Although it is true that what appeals to "prurient
interest" and what is "patently offensive" are issues of fact
to be left to the trier of fact, juries do not have unbridled
discretion in that regard.

In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S.

153, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974) appellant Jenkins was convicted
under Georgia's obscenity statute of displaying obscene
material, the film Carnal Knowledge.

The jury after proper

instruction, found the appellant guilty and also found that the
movie Carnal Knowledge appealed to both prurient interest and
displayed sexual conduct in a "patently offensive" manner.
appeal, the State of Georgia contended that whether a
particular depiction or portrayal is primarily designed to
15

On

appeal to prurient interest and displays sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way is a matter exclusively for the jury and
should not be the subject of judicial review.

The United

States Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the conviction.
Justice Renquist, now Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of
the Court and stated:
Even though questions of appeal to the
'prurient interest' or of patent
offensiveness are 'essentially questions of
fact', it would be a serious misreading of
Miller to conclude that juries have
unbridled discretion in determining what is
'patently offensive'. Not only did we
there say that 'the First Amendment values
applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment are adequately
protected by the ultimate power of
appellate courts to conduct an independent
review of constitutional claims when
necessary,' (citations omitted) but we made
it plain that under that holding 'no one
will be subject to prosecution for the sale
or exposure of obscene materials unless
these materials depict or describe patently
offensive "hard core" sexual conduct.'
(Citations omitted.)
Id. at 650.

Thus, to protect defendant from prosecution for

non "hard core" material, the court has the obligation to
determine as a matter of constitutional law whether the
particular matters "depict or describe patently offensive 'hard
core' sexual conduct."
B.

Id. at 650 - 651.

The materials depicted within the walls of defendant's

business are not, as a matter of constitutional law, obscene.
The matters depicted by the defendant (1) do not
appeal to "prurient interest", (2) do not portray any hard core
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way and, (3) when taken
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as a whole, bear the earmarks of artistic or political speech
rather than appealing to prurient interest.
A "prurient interest" in sex has been defined by the
United States Supreme Court as a "shameful or morbid interest
in sex."

See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472

U.S. 491, 504 - 505, 86 L.Ed.2d 394, 406 (1985) citing Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957).

In

viewing the matters depicted within defendant's business, it is
hard to imagine how anything there displayed could appeal to
anyone's interest in sex, morbid, shameful or otherwise.
Nothing there is sexy.

(The State's own witnesses admitted the

material was not sexy.

(Trial Transcript at pp. 193 - 194,

at Addendum.)

To understand just how tame the material

involved in this case is compared to other material which the
United States Supreme Court has held not to be obscene the
case of Central Magazine Sales Limited v. United States, 389
U.S. 50, 19 L.Ed.2d 49, reversing 373 F.2d 633 (4th Cir.
1967), is instructive.

In that case, the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit described the non-obscene
photographs, which were contained in a magazine called
"Exclusive", as follows:
Exclusive is a collection of photographs of
young women. In most of them long
stockings and garter belts are employed to
frame the pubic area and to focus
attention upon it. A suggestion of
masochism is sought by the use in many of
the pictures of chains binding the models'
wrists and ankles. Some of the seated
models, squarely facing the camera, have
their knees and legs wide spread in order
to reveal the genital area in its
entirety. In one of the pictures, all of
17

these things are combined: The model, clad
in only a framing black garter belt and
black stockings is chained to a chair upon
which she is seated, facing the camera,
with one knee elevated and both spread wide.
Central Magazine Sales, 373 F.2d at 634.
Given that the pictures described above are
constitutionally protected and are not obscene, it is absurd to
suggest that the matters depicted within defendant's business
are somehow more perverse, appeal more to the prurient
interest, and are more patently offensive.

It is clear from a

review of the relevant cases that the kinds of sexual conduct
which are considered obscene are markedly more severe and
"unusual" than what this defendant has displayed.

For

instance, a profusely illustrated book whose dominate theme was
sexual relations between human beings and animals was
considered obscene.

United States v. Friedman, 528 F.2d

784 (10th Cir. 1976).

Another example can be found in the

case of United States v. Various Articles of Obscene
Merchandise. 460 F.Supp. 826 (Dist. N.Y. 1978) wherein the
court held that a film which consisted entirely of two naked
teenage boys engaged in homosexual conduct, with no plot, point
or message and no acting or directorial skills was obscene.
Lastly, in a case particularly apposite to this case, because
it discusses what is and is not a "lewd exhibition of the
genitals", the court found that pictures in Penthouse
Magazine which included a naked woman with her finger inserted
into the lips of her genitals, so that it contacted her
clitoris, with eyes open and an expression consistent with
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masturbation on her face did constitute a lewd exhibition of
the genitals.

Penthouse v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1365

(5th Cir. 1980).

On the other hand, in the same case the

court determined that pictures of "young women either largely
or totally undressed, exposing various portions of their
bodies" did not constitute a lewd exhibition of the genitals.
Id.

Defendant's rough drawings do not reach the level of

"hard core" material.

They neither appeal to a "prurient

interest" in sex nor portray "sexual conduct" in a patently
offensive way.

The bed sheet graffiti in this case does not

rise to the level of "hard core" material that may subject the
owner to prosecution for the display of obscene material.
Judge Mower should have recognized that nothing on the bed
sheets was "hard core" and granted Turner's motion to dismiss,
and this court should now reverse Turner's conviction on that
basis.
Furthermore, it is clear that the predominate theme
of the matters depicted within defendant's business are not
sexual at all, but rather are primarily political.

Defendant

espouses such notions as anti-drugs, anti-abortion and free
thinking.

He asks "why not let someone else think for you?"

and "You're afraid face it."
will find you.

He warns:

"run and hide.

White flies will eat your flesh."

Death

The dominate

theme of the work is to shock the viewer and to motivate
introspection, to warn against drugs and abortion.

In Kois

v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S 229, 33 L.Ed.2d 312 (1972) the United
States Supreme Court held that in order for any material to be
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obscene its "dominate theme" must appeal to prurient interest
and cautioned that any reviewing court trying to determine
whether a particular work is protected or obscene must look at
the context in which the allegedly obscene matter appears.
Id.

The dominant theme of Turner's bed sheets is admittedly

difficult to identify precisely, but it is surely not to appeal
to a prurient interest in sex and most closely resembles
political or social commentary, including commentary on sexual
matters.
The items displayed by defendant may be vulgar, they
may be unusual or shocking and they may be contrary to the
prosecutor's or the court's notions of good taste, but they are
not obscene.

In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 29

L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) Justice Harlin observed:
One man's vulgarity is another man's
lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely
because governmental officials cannot make
principled distinctions in this area that
the constitution leaves matters of taste
and style so largely to the individual.
Id. at 25.

The material on Turner's sheets is more tame,

less graphic, less "hard core" and less offensive than the
material described in any reported obscenity case decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court or where certiorari has been denied.

To

uphold Turner's conviction is to limit the scope of protection
afforded by the United States and Utah Constitutions to a
degree far exceeding what any appellate court has done and far
exceeding the boundaries fixed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Judge Mower's
decision to deny Turner's motion to dismiss and to deny
Turner's motion for a directed verdict were in error.

Those

decisions should be reversed and therefore Turner's conviction
should be reversed as well.

Furthermore, independently of this

court's review of the propriety of Judge Mower's decisions
regarding Turner's motions, this court has the obligation to
review the allegedly obscene material and ensure that it is "a
graphic depiction of hard core sexual conduct" that may be
submitted to a jury for a determination of obscenity.

In this

case, the materials depicted in Turner's business are not a
patently offensive depiction of hard core sexual conduct and
therefore Mr. Turner cannot face prosecution for the display of
such materials because his conduct was and is constitutionally
protected by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
reversed.

On that basis as well his conviction should be

Additionally, the St. George Obscenity Statute is

unconstitutional on its face, should be struck down, and
Turner's conviction under the statute reversed.

Lastly,

Turner's conviction should be reversed because the State failed
to produce evidence to meet its burden to establish each of the
three prongs of the Miller test.
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ADDENDUM
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ORDINANCE NO. 2-77-2

AN ORDINANCE RELATING TO OBSCENITY AND
PROHIBITING CONDUCT RELATING THERETO;
PROVIDING PROCEDURES FOR INFORCEMENT;
FIXING A PENALTY; AND ESTABLISHING AN
EFFECTIVE DATE.

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF ST. GEORGE, UTA
Section 1. DEFINITIONS:

When used in this ordinance, the follow-

ing words shall have the following meanings:
a.

"Obscene" is a word descriptive of any material

or performance which, when taken as a whole and considered in the
context of the contemporary standards of this community:

b.

c.

(1)

Appeals to prurient interest in sex;

(2)

Portrays sexual conduct in a patently offensi
manner;

(3)

Has no serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value.

"Material" means:
(1)

Any printed or written book, magazine, articl
pamphlet, writing or printing;

(2)

Any picture, illustration, drawing, photograp
motion picture or pictorial representation;

(3)

Any statue or other figure;

(4)

Any recording or transcription;

(5)

Any reproduction including but not limited to
mechanical, chemical, or electrical reproduct
ions ;

(6)

Any undeveloped photographs, models, printing
plates, and other latent representational
objects;

(7)

Anything which is or may be used as a means
of communication.

"Performance11 means any play, motion picture, or

any physical human bodily activity, whether engaged in alone or
with other persons, including but not limited to singing, speakinj
dancing, acting, simulating, pantomining, or other exhibition
performed before an audience.

d.

"Contemporary community standards1' means those

moral standards of decency existing in this community at the time
the offense is alleged to have occurred.
e.

"Sexual conduct" includes any of the following

described forms of sexual conduct if depicted or described in a
patently offensive way:
(1)

An act of sexual intercourse normal or
perverted, actual or simulated, including
genital-genital, anal-genital, oral-anal,
or oral-genital intercourse, whether between
human beings or between a human being and
an animal, or between animals.

(2)

Masturbation, excretion, execretory functions
or lewd exhibition of the genitals, including
any explicit close-up representation of a
human genital organ or a spread eagle exposure
of female genital organs.

(3)

Physical contact or simulated physical contact
with the clothed or unclothed pubic areas or
buttocks of a human male or female, whether
alone or between members of the same or
opposite sex or between humans and animals
in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or
gratification.

(4)

Nudity of human Dubic areas, buttocks, genital
organs or female breasts below the top of
the areola.

f.

"Prurient interest" means a shameful, morbid,

lustful, lascivious or lewd interest in nudity, sex, sexual conduc
or excretion.
g.

"Knowingly" means to have an awareness, actual

or constructive, of the character of the material or of a performance.

A person has constructive knowledge, if a reasonable

inspection or observation under the circumstances would have disclosed the nature of the subject matter.
h.

"Public place" means a place accessible or visible

to members of the public or to casual passersby whether or not a
fee or charge is made for entrance.
i.

"Distribute" means to transfer possession of

materials with or without consideration.
-?-

j.

"Furnish" means to sell, give, present, rent, 1c

or otherwise provide.
k.

"Display publicly" means the exposing, placing,

posting, exhibiting, advertising or in any fashion displaying in
any public place.
Section 2: PROHIBITED CONDUCT:
a. No person shall knowlingly:

b.

(1)

Distribute, display publicly, furnish or
provide to any person any obscene material
or performance; or

(2)

Prepare, publish, print, create, advertise
or possess any obscene material or performanc
or

(3)

Distribute, exhibit, or offer to distribute,
or exhibit, any obscene material.

Each separate offense under this section is a

class B misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more then $299.00
and by incarceration for a term of not more than six months.
c.

Each separate offense under this section, in addi

ion to all other penalties, shall result in an immediate and auto
matic revocation of the business license of the person convicted
hereunder, without further action by the City Council.
Section 3:

INDUCING ACCEPTANCE OF OBSCENE MATERIAL:
a.

No person shall knowingly induce acceDtance of

obscene material or performance:

b.

(1)

As a condition to a sale, allocation, consignment, or delivery for resale of any newspaper,
magazine, periodical, book, publication, motio
picture film, or other merchandise.

(2)

By denying, revoking, or threatening to deny
or revoke a franchise, or by imposing any
penalty, financial or otherwise, because of
the failure or refusal to accept obscene
material or material reasonably believed by
the purchaser or consignee to be obscene.

Each separate offense under this section is a

class B misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $299.00
and by incarceration for a term of not more than six months.
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c.

Each separate offense under this section, in

addition to all other penalties,

shall result in an immediate

and automatic revocation of the business license of the person
convicted hereunder without further action by the city.
Section 4:

EXPERT TESTIMONY NOT REQUIRED.
a.

Neither the prosecutor nor the defense shall be

required to, but may, introduce expert testimony concerning the
obscene character of the material or performance which is the
subject of the prosecution under this ordinance.
Section 5: SEIZURE AND DISPOSITION OF PROHIBITED MATERIALS,
INJUNCTIONS AND JURISDICTION:
a.

Any person who is authorized to arrest any person

ror a violation of this J^a« is also authorized to seize any of
the prohibited articles found in possession or under the control
of the person arrested and to deliver them to the magistrate before whom the person arrested is required to be taken.
b.

The city magistrate to whom any of the prohibited

articles are delivered pursuant to subsection (a) must, upon the
examination of the accused, or if the examination is delayed or
prevented, without awaiting the examination, determine the character of the article, and if he finds it to be obscene he must
deliver one copy to the prosecuting attorney for the city and
must at once impound all the other copies until the defendant is
acquitted, the prosecution abandoned, or the time for appeal has
elapsed, or in the case of an appeal, until the matter is finally
adjudicated by the appropriate appellate court, and then he shall
cause them to be destroyed or returned to the accused, as the
case may be.
c.

Upon the final conviction of the accused, the

prosecuting attorney must cause any writing, paper, book, picture,
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print, design, figure, still or motion picture, photograph or
negative thereof, photocopy, engraving, sound recording, card,
instrument, or other thing which is obscene in respect whereof
the accused stands convicted and which remains in the possession
or under control of the prosecuting attorney to be destroyed.
d.

The city court of this city has jurisdiction to

enjoin the sale, distribution or exhibition of obscene material
or performances, as follows:

Section 6:

(1)

Any person who sells or offers for sale,
distributes, exhibits or is about to sell,
distribute, or exhibit, or has in his possession with intent to sell, distribute or
exhibit, or is about to acquire possession
with intent to sell, distribute, or exhibit
any material which is obscene may be enjoined
in an action in the city or circuit court
by the city prosecutor to prevent the sale,
distribution, exhibition, acquisition, or
possession of the obscene material.

(2)

Every person who sells, distributes, exhibits,
displays publicly, or acquires possession
with intent to sell, distribute, display
publicly or exhibit any of the matters referred to in this section, after service upon
him of a summons and complaint in any action
brought by the prosecuting attorney pursuant
to this section, is presumed to have knowledge
of the contents of the material listed in the
complaint from the date of service.

(3)

The person sought to be enjoined shall be
entitled to a trial of the issues within a
reasonable time after joinder of issue and
said trial shall be granted a priority trial
setting by the court. In the event a final
judgment of injunction is entered for the
city, the final judgment shall contain an
order directing the defendant to surrender
to the Chief of Police of this city all of
the material described in the complaint and
found to be obscene, and the Chief of Police
shall be directed to destroy it.

DEFENSES: The following defenses may be raised in any

prosecution under this ordinance.
a.

That the distribution of obscene material was

restricted to institutions or persons having bona fide scientific;
educational, governmental, or other similar justification for
possessing such material; however, bona fide justification does
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THE WITNESS:

2

MR. BOYACK:

3

THE COURT:

4

THE WITNESS:

5

Q.

So which question am I answering?
I'm asking you

—

The last one that he asked you.
Would you repeat it, please.

(By Mr. Boyack)

Since I can't, I'm going to ask

6

you another one.

7

if I say "fuck authority," that that's a political statement?

I just asked can it be taken in the context J

B

A.

Yes.

9

QL

It could be political, it could be obscene?

ID

A.

Yes.

11

QL

In your opinion?

12

A.

Yes.

13

QL

N O W , I'm going to show you what has been marked

14

as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6, that I assume you testified

15

to as the ceiling.

16

either one?

17

illegal or maybe both.

18 !
19

A.

Do you find that objectionable or illegal J

If so, state whether it's objectionable or

As far as its legality, again, I wasn't sure if

it was illegal or not.

20

Q.

Are you sure now?

21

A.

No.

22
23
24
25 j

Again, I believe that's for the jury to

decide.
Q.

So your testimony to this jury, you don't know

whether or not Mr. Turner should be found guilty, because
you don't know whether that's legal or illegal, is that what

ft

Okay,

And if you read it, it said, too, in part,

that the item to be obscene, had to be taken as a whole,
is that true?

Do you remember that in the language?

A.

Yeah, I do.

ft

Okay.

Now, if I could have those pictures back

wherever they ended up.
These particular pictures depict a —

all around the

different areas of the storage unit, is that true?
A.
were —

All the banners and the posters that were up there
that were hand done were on the north wall and the

northeajst wall.
ft

Okay.

Let me show you what has been marked as

Plaintiff's No. 4 and ask you if looking at the picture
"Run and hide.

Death will find you."

Do you think that's

a political statement?
A.

I have no idea.

ft

You donft know what it means, do you?

A.

No, sir, I do not.

ft

It's an expression of the author of whoever wrote

it, is that correct?
A.

I have no idea, sir.

ft

So it could be literary, it could be political,

but you don't know?
A.

I don't know.

ft

But it's not sexual, is it?
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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A.

That item is not.

Q.

Now, looking at the same photograph, it says,

"Sold your soul."

What do you think that means?

A.

Do you want my opinion?

Q.

Yeah, Ifm asking you if you know what it means.

A.

Sold your soul, I would think —

anybody who

has heard of any kind of devil worshipping or anything
like that, you sold your soul to the devil.
Q.

Well, you think that's a devil worship slogan?

A-

Well, to me it would be. You asked my opinion and

that would be my opinion that it would be selling your
soul to the devil.
Qt

Okay.

You don't mean it sells —

it couldn't

mean, in your opinion, then, sold your soul to society or
to an establishment, something like that —
A.

I've never heard it used that way, but it could

Q.

Sure could be, couldn't it?

A.

Sure.

Qt

The fact is that you guessed when you thought that

be.

might be some devil worship, didn't you?
A.

Well, from my upbringing, it would be — my

interpretation is selling your soul to the devil.
Q.

Okay.

But in any case, it's not sexual in

nature, is it?
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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A.

No, sir.

Q.

"White flies will eat your flesh."

What does

that mean?
A.

I have no idea.

Q.

Sexual in nature?

A.

I hope not.

Q.

In other words, there was just all kinds of

outrageous, childish, kiddish statements on that wall,
correct?

And some of them may have had some sexual connota-

tions, isn't that true?
A.

That's true.

Q.

But taken as a whole as you understand the statute

in St. George, there was some political statements, wasn't
there?
A,

There may be here.

Q.

And depending on how you interpret it, there was

some literary statements also?

I don't know.

It may not have been good,

but it certainly appeared to be literary, right?
A.

Okay.

Qt

Now, looking at Defendant's No. 1, calling your

attention up to the left-hand corner where it says "drugs,"
then it's got a line through it like it's a sign, how do
you interpret that?
A.

To be like a road sign saying "saying no to drugs."

Q.

I'm asking you if that's what it looks like to you.
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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A.

That's what it appears to me.

Q.

And would that be interpretative of saying no to

drugs or no drugs or no drugs here or something like that?
A.

That's what it appeared to me.

Q.

Is that a political statement?

A.

It's a statement.

Q.

Drugs right now is the biggest political issue,

it's going on right now contemporarily, isn't it?
A.

Yeah.

Qt

And when you put "no to drugs/' that's a political

statement, is it not?
A.

Okay, yeah.

ft

And you don't deny that on that wall in all that

quote "graffiti" as you said it are political statements?
A.

I would say some of them were probably.

Qt

Now, let's get down to business here a little bit

and look at some of the more interesting stuff.

Looking

at the term "group sex," that's something that sounds
a little more interesting, isn't it?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

What do you think that means?

A.

Exactly what it would imply to me.

A group of

people having sex.
Q.

Would that mean having multiple sexual partners?

A.

Pardon me?
191

A.

A record.

ft

What does it say down at the bottom?

A.

Group sex.

Q.

In other words, the group sex that you thought

stood for multiple partners could well have been the name
of a rock group, isnft that true?
A.

Yes, sir.

Qt

Now, we've talked about taking this whole thing as

a whole.
interest.

I'd like to talk about it appealing to prurient
Do you remember that when you read that statute?

Do you remember that?
A.

Yes.

Qt

Now, we're pretty good friends, aren't we?

A.

Yes.

Qt

Did that —

did the worst drawing, that is, the

most dirty, vulgar, and I'm using maybe my own language,
but for purposes of emphasis, did the worst picture there
appeal to your prurient interest in sex?
A.

I would say that there was one there that did.

I would have to say there was one.
Qt

And it sexually excited you

—

A.

I don't know if it excited me, but it was —

definitely to me it was out of the ordinary as far as being Qt

Out of the ordinary, unusual, but was it designed,

when looking at this whole thing as a whole, was it designed
BYHON RAY CHRISTIANSEN.
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to appeal to your prurient interests in sexual matters?
A,

I would — no.

&

No, right?

A.

No.
MR. BOYACK:

No further questions, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Shumway?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION,
BY MR. SHUMWAY:
Qt

Which one were you referring to there?

A,

There's, on this northeast wall, a picture of

a woman with her legs spread.
THE COURT: Which exhibit

number are you referring

to, Mr. Hatzidakis?
THE WITNESS:

Exhibit No. 2, sir.

Qt

(By Mr. Shumway)

And why did you pick that lady

A.

She's laid back with her legs spread and it shows

out?

like pubic hair and above her it says, "Tuna factory."
Qt

Now, a lot of things on there are different,

aren't they?
A.

Why is this one picked out by you?

Well, it just —

it appears to be sexual in nature

on that one.
Q.

Do you know what it means to appeal to prurient

interest?
A.

It means to get me excited.
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, JR.
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Nothing further,.

MR. BOYACK:

I'm through .

Thanks, Mr. Hatzidakis .

THE COURT:

Mr. Shumway, what else?
MR. SHUMWAY:

at this point,
The Ci.ty would rest <

your Honor.
MR. BOYACK:

I have a motion at th is time, your

MR. SHUMWAY:

May he be excused or do you want

Honor.

him to stick around too.
MR. BOYACK:
THE COURT:

No, he can be excused.
Thank you, Mr. Hatzidakis.

You're

excused.
(Witness excused.)
THE COURT:

We'll need to have the jury go

out then.
Ladies and gentlemen, there's something I need to
handle in the case that unfortunately you cannot listen to.
I need to have you go out.

And the bailiff will assist

you and find a place where you can be, and then he'll have
you come back in when we're ready.

Please don't talk about

this case with anybody or form or express an opinion on it
till it's finally submitted to you.
Okay.

Thank you.

The jury's outside the courtroom.

MR, BOYACK:

Yes.

Mr. Boyack?

I have a motion to dismiss

on the basis that the City has totally failed to meet its
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had political, had literary functions which would be the
kiss of death to a prosecution successfully under the
statute.
And then it goes on, it portrays sexual conduct in a
patently-offensive manner. Again, it's sort of a continuous
argument, but saying from their own witnesses that it
was subject to one picture, we all figured, I guess, eventually
would get down to. And that in and of itself, if taken
by itself, I suppose, you could sustain our argument, that
it was patently sexually offensive by itself, but in order
to be guilty under the statute, it has to be taken in the
meaning and the framework of the entire —

the entire

picture.
Item No. 3, I'm just going down through the ordinance,
has no literary, artistic, political —
political — or scientific value.

I've circled

I can't one iota of

scientific value, but I certainly think an argument can
be made both for literary and artistic and certainly each
witness has admitted it has political value.
Then it goes on defining certain things that are not
really applicable here.
In order to have been found guilty, Mr. Turner, Mr.
Shumway would have had to have met a burden that each one
of the bases had to be touched in rounding third base for
home.
BYRON
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THE COURT:

Let me stop you just a minute.

The

clerk gave me a note wondering if a lady in the observation
room is a defense witness.

Apparently she didn't know her

and I don't know who it is either, but are one of your
witnesses there, Mr. —
MR. BOYACK:

She is, your Honor.

I didn't see

her there.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thanks for bringing that up.

Okay, you were talking about having to touch each one of
the bases

—
MR. BOYACK: Yeah.

Where I was at was I'm saying

that if you get up to bat here, you at least have got to
have a chance of being able to touch all three of the
bases and then come home.
They missed first base, which is it's a political and
it has political ramifications all through it and that's
been their own testimony in their case in chief.
It —

I guess it's a matter of what is serious literary

value, but I think we've established that it had literary
value of some type, in that the author had statements
to make.
And three, we have to take this whole thing as a whole,
and if you do that, the other two things come in, that is,
the literary and the political aspects of it.

And then

you can get down and discuss whether there's a prurient
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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interest or there isn't. And the officerfs own testimony
was it didn't appeal to his prurient interest and I don't
think they've sustained a burden.

I think they have an

obligation to touch all of those bases before they can
take that to the jury.

And their case, after they've

rested, clearly shows an acquittal with no room for any
interpretation of any reasonable doubt.

Their own witnesses

agree that they haven't met their burden.
they agree with that in saying —

I'm not saying

by saying "we agree we

haven't met your burden," but they certainly said there is
literary, political and —
played into it —

I don't think artistic ever

and I think this case should be killed

at this point. On any basis of any case, failing to establish
by any reasonable means whatsoever, how a reasonable jury
could find, given their case in chief, that there is a
violation of their own statute, and I would submit it on
that.
THE COURT:

Mr. Shumway, I don't have a lot of

trouble in being able to say that the witnesses have talked
about an appeal to prurient interest.

I agree Mr.

Hatzidakis was operating under a misapprehension of what
the word meant, but what about this taken as a whole argument
We've got part of a drawing on two, what appeared to me to
be bedsheets. What about the taken as a whole argument?
How do you respond to that?
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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MR. SHUMWAY:

If your Honor please, the matter

taken as a whole could be typified any of several ways.
There's probably as much sexual content there as there is
political.

There's some —

MR. BOYACK:

If that's the case, they lose.

THE COURT:

If it's evenly balanced

MR. BOYACK:

—

It isn't a balancing argument

I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt.

—

That's terribly

discourteous.
MR. SHUMWAY:

If taken as a whole, it appeals

to these things and fails to —
THE COURT:

You know, what Mr. Boyack said is

an interesting thing.

Is it a balancing test.

Does

taken as a whole mean you balance, because if you look
at both of these bedsheets, what's the theme?

There's

no one theme that overrides anything else.
MR. SHUMWAY:
test, your Honor.

But I don't think it's a balancing

It doesn't say anywhere that the primary

thing has to be sexual.
it has that effect.

It just says taken as a whole,

I think that the thing taken as a whole

can have several effects.

If I were a rabid political

zealot of a conservative persuasion, I suppose I could
be affected by the thing as —

as a political matter.

But

I think it also to the average person, and particularly
a young person, I think it has definitely got a very strong
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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sexual theme.

I see sexual innuendos in the form of

symbols, and so on, slipped into things at different times
and if there's enough of that, you soon reach a point where
there's a sexual message, a sexual impact delivered by that
total depiction, the whole thing.
I don't think that I have to show that it's primarily
sexual, but if it has a sexual message, portrays some
sexuality that is obscene, that's sufficient.
you could have a —

I don't think

there are cases that have some excerpts

from writings or maybe an illustration taken in a whole
context of a book, has some really value, and the courts have
so held.

But if you take this whole thing as a whole, there'^

not enough other stuff, literature or politics or whatever,
to justify and give redeeming value to that portion that's
offensive — obscene.
And so just because you have some decent plot or
some decent message somewhere, doesn't mean you can therefore
have free license to interject as much filth and raunch
as you want.

The one does not give license to the other.

If the sexual content were strictly secondary and
not offensive when considered with the other, then there's
some redeeming value in this thing.

I don't find this

taken as a whole has any redeeming value, even political,
but I believe that's a jury question.

I think Mr. Boyack's

arguing facts that should be presented to the jury.
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR.
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1

involved is not how the picture now impresses the individual

2

juror, but rather considering the intended and probable

3

recipients how the picture would have impressed the average

4

person or member of a deviant sexual group.

5

picture that any of the State/Cityfs evidence was —

6

a woman in the nude drawn with a paint can, and from that,

7

counsel wants to infer that that, in and of itself, I guess

B

together with tuna factory and eat me and some of these

The worst
is

9) other words, is the predominant thing of all of those
10

statements that were made that the witness has agreed were

11

either political or literary.

12

And it just won't reach.

Ther^

I is not enough stride in Steve Garvey to touch first and

13 I call this player out.

It's strictly been three foul balls

and three strikes, and I believe this Court has a duty not
15

to allow a case to go to a jury where they clearly haven't

16

met the burden as law in the case that they have to.

17

I

And I'm very strong in requesting the Court to dismiss

18

this case on the basis of failure to meet the corpus delicti

19

of their own statute, which their own witnesses basically

20

21

I agree, factually hasn't been met.
MR. SHUMWAY:

If your Honor please, the language

22

quoted by counsel is from the old Memoirs vs. Massachusettes

23

test, which was later picked up by People vs. Roth.

24

was overruled by Miller vs. California.

25

And that

You no longer show

the dominant theme of the material as a whole appeals to

prurient interest in sex.

And now it's whether the average

person applying contemporary community standards is
defining that the word taken as a whole, appeals to
prurient interest.
now controls.

And the Miller case is the one that

They've taken out the "utterly without

redeeming social value" part of the thing.
changes.

There's various

Some a little subtle, some more specific.

But

the test that now applies, you don't have to prove anything
about a dominent theme.
10

It's just whether the work taken

1 as a whole appeals to the prurient interest.

And I don't

11

I care what else is in there, if it appeals to the prurient

12

I interest, and that isn't just a macho man being aroused

131 as the Court knows, then it's obscene.
14

1

15

1

And this jury has

a right to look at it, evaluate it, apply the community
standard and make that determination.
MR. BOYACK:

I wasn't quoting from Miller or from

Roth or from anything else.

I was quoting from Section 277

of the St. George statute. And —
MR. SHUMWAY: No, the dominant theme thing that
you read is just from —
MR. BOYACK: Well, yeah.
THE COURT:

But I'm saying

—

You quoted your proposed Instruction

23 1
I No• 4, Mr. Boyack, and that's what Mr. Shumway is saying
24 1
1 has been replaced by Miller vs. California.
205
25 1
1
MR. BOYACK: Well, I don't see anything in here
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about redeeming social quality in here.
about —

We're talking

and I don't think that any of this has been
MR. SHUMWAY:

—

They've taken the redeeming out

and now it says whether the word taken as a whole lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
The ordinance tracks Miller pretty
MR. BOYACK:

—

I understand it does.

But I'm just

saying that in defining the ordinance, this is the test
that's (inaudible) by their own ordinance.

Their own

ordinance says you've got to take it as a whole.
that.

It says

Their own ordinance says it has to be without politica

literary, artistic —

we haven't put any evidence on of

its artistic value, but we will, and what was the other,
literary.
THE COURT:

Scientific is the one that you —

MR. BOYACK:

Scientific.

That doesn't apply.

But their own witnesses says, "Yeah, it could be literary,"
their own witnesses said, "Yeah, it could be political,"
and they're out by their statute not by Miller vs. United
States or Roth or Pinkus or any of the alphabet soup
that we have in the obscenity area of the law.

I'm talking

about purely under their own statute facts that we applied.
THE COURT:

The motion to dismiss is denied.

And I'll tell you the reason why.

The problem I see here

is we've got a picture which is like a collage, a whole group]
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of unrelated things that are —

happen to be close to each

other that are (inaudible) opposed next to one another.
And I think if I granted the motion, it would be like
saying

people

can put together political and artistic

and have a little obscene part down here in the corner,
but if the overriding thing is political, then the obscenity
is protected, and I don't think that that's the intent of
the ordinance, nor it is the intent of Miller vs.
California.

And since there appears to me to not be an

overriding theme in these banners or these bedsheets, I
think we can look at each part individually.
And on that basis, the motion to dismiss is denied.
Now, we're back to you, Mr. Boyack.
it's through with its evidence.
witnesses is here.

The City says

Apparently one of your

Are you ready to start with

MR. BOYACK:
THE COURT:

—

I'm ready to proceed any time.
Okay.

I'd like to have us all just

stay right here. We could get the jury brought back in
so we don't have to take a break.

Is that okay with

everybody?
MR. BOYACK:
THE COURT:
2:43.

That's fine.
For the purpose of the record, it's

The jury's back in the jury box.

present with counsel.

The parties are

The City has finished its case. Mr.

Boyack, you're ready to go with your case, now?
Ov.nw RAY CHHI»T!AN»tN. J*.
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